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Presentation
A presentation about Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Equivalence, Pro
t Maximization, and Information Disclosure.
AMMA
2009
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
2009
Springer
ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experien...
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
12 years 8 months ago
2011
IEEE
—Dynamic spectrum allocation has proven promising for mitigating the spectrum scarcity problem. In this model, primary users lease chunks of under-utilized spectrum to secondary ...