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CORR
2002
Springer
105views Education» more  CORR 2002»
13 years 3 months ago
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2004
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among ...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 8 months ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
107views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 8 months ago
Using value queries in combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on bundles of items are known to be desirable auction mechanisms for selling items that are complementary and/or substitutable. Howev...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2003
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm