Auctions are promising decentralized methods for teams of agents to allocate and re-allocate tasks among themselves in dynamic, partially known and time-constrained domains with p...
Abstract. In this paper we address a model of self interested information agents competing to perform tasks. The agents are situated in an uncertain environment while different tas...
Generalized Vickrey mechanisms have received wide attention in the literature because they are efficient and strategyproof, i.e. truthful bidding is optimal whatever the bids of o...
Current technological developments and application-driven demands are bringing us closer to the realization of autonomous multirobot systems performing increasingly complex missio...
In a market-based scheduling mechanism, the allocation of time-specific resources to tasks is governed by a competitive bidding process. Agents bidding for multiple, separately al...
Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Anna Osepayshvili, Daniel...