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AI
2004
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
Efficient learning equilibrium
Efficient Learning Equilibrium (ELE) is a natural solution concept for multi-agent encounters with incomplete information. It requires the learning algorithms themselves to be in ...
Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz
IJCIA
2002
137views more  IJCIA 2002»
13 years 4 months ago
Co-Evolution in Social Interactions
An interesting problem which has been widely investigated is under what circumstances will a society of rational agents realize some particular stable situations, and whether they ...
Hiroshi Sato, Akira Namatame
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Learning to cooperate in multi-agent social dilemmas
In many Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), agents (even if selfinterested) need to cooperate in order to maximize their own utilities. Most of the multi-agent learning algorithms focus on...
Jose Enrique Munoz de Cote, Alessandro Lazaric, Ma...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Learning to commit in repeated games
Learning to converge to an efficient, i.e., Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium of the repeated game is an open problem in multiagent learning. Our goal is to facilitate the learning ...
Stéphane Airiau, Sandip Sen
ICML
2003
IEEE
14 years 5 months ago
Learning To Cooperate in a Social Dilemma: A Satisficing Approach to Bargaining
Learning in many multi-agent settings is inherently repeated play. This calls into question the naive application of single play Nash equilibria in multi-agent learning and sugges...
Jeff L. Stimpson, Michael A. Goodrich