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» Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial)...
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AAAI
2004
13 years 5 months ago
Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions
Recent algorithms provide powerful solutions to the problem of determining cost-minimizing (or revenue-maximizing) allocations of items in combinatorial auctions. However, in many...
Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields
CORR
2002
Springer
105views Education» more  CORR 2002»
13 years 3 months ago
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 8 months ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2004
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among ...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
EOR
2011
140views more  EOR 2011»
12 years 7 months ago
Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope
Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. Preference elicitation is already a problem in single-unit combinatorial auctions, but it bec...
Martin Bichler, Stefan Schneider, Kemal Guler, Meh...