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» Eliciting Truthful Feedback for Binary Reputation Mechanisms
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SIGECOM
2006
ACM
125views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2006»
13 years 11 months ago
Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback
Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting and th...
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
AAAI
2012
11 years 7 months ago
A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations
Peer prediction mechanisms allow the truthful elicitation of private signals (e.g., experiences, or opinions) in regard to a true world state when this ground truth is unobservabl...
Jens Witkowski, David C. Parkes
INFOCOM
2008
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Achieving Honest Ratings with Reputation-Based Fines in Electronic Markets
—The effectiveness of online feedback mechanisms for rating the performance of providers in electronic markets is vulnerable to the submission of dishonest ratings. In this paper...
Thanasis G. Papaioannou, George D. Stamoulis
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Robust Incentive-Compatible Feedback Payments
Abstract. Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting...
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings