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» Empirical Hardness for Mixed Auctions
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CAEPIA
2009
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Empirical Hardness for Mixed Auctions
Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCAs) offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents. However, little is known about the fac...
Pablo Almajano, Jesús Cerquides, Juan A. Ro...
ATAL
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
On the Empirical Evaluation of Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
Abstract. Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions extend and generalise all the preceding types of combinatorial auctions. In this paper, we try to make headway on the practical ap...
Meritxell Vinyals, Jesús Cerquides
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Computationally-efficient winner determination for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents offering goods and services. Their winner deter...
Andrea Giovannucci, Meritxell Vinyals, Juan A. Rod...
MOBIHOC
2010
ACM
13 years 2 months ago
Breaking bidder collusion in large-scale spectrum auctions
Dynamic spectrum auction is an effective solution to provide spectrum on-demand to many small wireless networks. As the number of participants grows, bidder collusion becomes a se...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng
ATAL
2011
Springer
12 years 5 months ago
Solving Stackelberg games with uncertain observability
Recent applications of game theory in security domains use algorithms to solve a Stackelberg model, in which one player (the leader) first commits to a mixed strategy and then th...
Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr