Sciweavers

30 search results - page 1 / 6
» Ex Ante Information and the Design of Keyword Auctions
Sort
View
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
117views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 11 months ago
First-price path auctions
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
AAAI
2011
12 years 5 months ago
Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms
The most prominent way to establish trust between buyers and sellers on online auction sites are reputation mechanisms. Two drawbacks of this approach are the reliance on the sell...
Jens Witkowski, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
139views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Parameterizing the winner determination problem for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions have been studied by the multiagent systems community for some time, since these auctions are an effective mechanism for resource allocation when agents are...
David Loker, Kate Larson