We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...
Combinatorial auctions are difficult to analyze in part because of the vast number of potential strategies available to the bidders. Proxy bidding interfaces limit the users’ s...
Peter R. Wurman, Gangshu Cai, Jie Zhong, Ashish Su...
Abstract: The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (singl...
Using a model of agent behavior based around envy-reducing strategies, we describe an iterated combinatorial auction in which the allocation and prices converge to a solution in t...
Many important combinatorial optimization problems can be expressed as constraint satisfaction problems with soft constraints. When problems are too difficult to be solved exactly,...