Abstract: This paper defines the extensive form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) for extensive games with perfect recall. The EFCE concept extends Aumann's strategic-form correla...
We show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms ...
Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses, Mosh...
In a landmark paper, Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] described a polynomial-time algorithm (“Ellipsoid Against Hope”) for computing sample correlated equilibria of concis...
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytical...
Noah D. Stein, Pablo A. Parrilo, Asuman E. Ozdagla...
abstraction of imperfect information games ANDREW GILPIN and TUOMAS SANDHOLM Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA, USA Finding an equilibrium of an...