15 search results - page 3 / 3 » Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and ... |
FOCS
2005
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
2005
IEEE
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
AIR
2004
13 years 5 months ago
2004
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
ATAL
2004
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2004
Springer
Auctions and exchanges are important coordination mechanisms for multiagent systems. Most multi-good markets are combinatorial in that the agents have preferences over bundles of ...
AMEC
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of market mechanisms. The language is based on a set of welldefined principles, and is designed to captur...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2010
Springer
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have bee...