14 search results - page 1 / 3 » Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value |
EOR
2008
13 years 4 months ago
2008
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
The Shapley Value is arguably the most important normative solution concept in coalitional games. One of its applications is in the domain of networks, where the Shapley Value is u...
ICLP
1999
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
1999
Springer
Fair allocation of payoffs among cooperating players who can form various coalitions of differing utilities is the classic game theoretic “coalition problem.” Shapley’s va...
MATES
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
In the setting of cooperation of rational web service agents via coalition formation, we devise an algorithm BSCA-P to form recursively bilateral Shapley value stable coalitions. T...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider collusion in path procurement auctions, where payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show that collusion can increase the utility of the agents, and in som...