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» From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions
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SIGECOM
2005
ACM
109views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions
We investigate the class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items in unlimited supply. We adopt the worst-case competitive framework defined by [8, 4] th...
Jason D. Hartline, Robert McGrew
FOCS
2007
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy
We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic age...
Frank McSherry, Kunal Talwar
SODA
2003
ACM
132views Algorithms» more  SODA 2003»
13 years 6 months ago
Online learning in online auctions
We consider the problem of revenue maximization in online auctions, that is, auctions in which bids are received and dealt with one-by-one. In this note, we demonstrate that resul...
Avrim Blum, Vijay Kumar, Atri Rudra, Felix Wu
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
106views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 10 months ago
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
We study auctions for a commodity in unlimited supply, e.g., a digital good. In particular we consider three desirable properties for auctions: • Competitive: the auction achiev...
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
132views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design
We study auctions for selling a limited supply of a single commodity in the case where the supply is known in advance and the case it is unknown and must be instead allocated in a...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline