We consider profit-maximization problems for combinatorial auctions with non-single minded valuation functions and limited supply. We obtain fairly general results that relate the ...
Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmoud Fouz, Chaitanya Swam...
We consider truthful online auctions that aim at optimizing sellers’ revenues, representing service contributors’ satisfactions, as a general model for pricing peer-to-peer se...
We explore the revenue capabilities of truthful, monotone (“fair”) allocation and pricing functions for resource-constrained auction mechanisms within a general framework that ...
The deregulation of the electricity industry in many countries has created a number of marketplaces in which producers and consumers can operate in order to more effectively manage...
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a broad class of re...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...