This paper considers a general setting for structured procurement and the problem a buyer faces in designing a procurement mechanism to maximize profit. This brings together two a...
Matthew Cary, Abraham D. Flaxman, Jason D. Hartlin...
We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purch...
Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahy...
We consider collusion in path procurement auctions, where payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show that collusion can increase the utility of the agents, and in som...
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
We show that random graphs in the preferential connectivity model have constant conductance, and hence have worst-case routing congestion that scales logarithmically with the numb...
Milena Mihail, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Amin Sab...