Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCAs) allow agents to bid for bundles of goods to buy, goods to sell, and transformations of goods. In particular, MMUCAs offer a high ...
Combinatorial auctions, where buyers can bid on bundles of items rather than bidding them sequentially, often lead to more economically efficient allocations of financial resource...
This paper presents new clearing algorithms for multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial auctions with piecewise linear demand/supply functions. We analyse the complexi...
Abstract. We present a Lagrangian-based heuristic LAHA for the Winner Determination Problem in Combinatorial Auctions. The algorithm makes use of the market computing power by appl...
Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions extend and generalize all the preceding types of combinatorial auctions. In this paper, we try to make headway on the practical application...