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INFOCOM
2009
IEEE
14 years 3 days ago
TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions
— We design truthful double spectrum auctions where multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing sp...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng
AAAI
2004
13 years 6 months ago
Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are important mechanisms for allocating interrelated items. Unfortunately, winner determination is NP-complete unless there is special structure. We s...
Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sand...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
152views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 5 months ago
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
Shahar Dobzinski, Mukund Sundararajan
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation
In the course allocation problem, a university administrator seeks to efficiently and fairly allocate schedules of over-demanded courses to students with heterogeneous preferences...
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, Eric Budish
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Evaluating bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions
Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raises challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary ...
Teddy Candale, Sandip Sen