We present a new technique for verifying correspondences in security protocols. In particular, correspondences can be used to formalize authentication. Our technique is fully auto...
Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are composed of many small protocols, compositional analysi...
Suzana Andova, Cas J. F. Cremers, Kristian Gj&osla...
We present complexity results for the verification of security protocols. Since the perfect cryptography assumption is unrealistic for cryptographic primitives with visible algebr...
Schneider's work on rank functions [14] provides a formal approach to verification of certain properties of a security protocol. However, he illustrates the approach only wit...
In the context of Dolev-Yao style analysis of security protocols, we consider the capability of an intruder to dynamically choose and assign names to agents. This capability has b...