We propose a new language-based approach to mitigating timing channels. In this language, well-typed programs provably leak only a bounded amount of information over time through ...
We investigate techniques for general black-box mitigation of timing channels. The source of events is wrapped by a timing mitigator that delays output events so that they contain...
—This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side-channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how mo...
Bart Coppens, Ingrid Verbauwhede, Koen De Bosscher...
When termination of a program is observable by an adversary, confidential information may be leaked by terminating accordingly. While this termination covert channel has limited ...
Deian Stefan, Alejandro Russo, Pablo Buiras, Amit ...
Abstract This paper investigates simple and robust transparency-attainable control architectures for bilateral teleoperation. The strength of two-channel control architectures and ...