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» Learning equilibria in repeated congestion games
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ATAL
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Learning equilibria in repeated congestion games
While the class of congestion games has been thoroughly studied in the multi-agent systems literature, settings with incomplete information have received relatively little attenti...
Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar
ICML
2008
IEEE
14 years 5 months ago
No-regret learning in convex games
Quite a bit is known about minimizing different kinds of regret in experts problems, and how these regret types relate to types of equilibria in the multiagent setting of repeated...
Geoffrey J. Gordon, Amy R. Greenwald, Casey Marks
NIPS
2003
13 years 6 months ago
Learning Near-Pareto-Optimal Conventions in Polynomial Time
We study how to learn to play a Pareto-optimal strict Nash equilibrium when there exist multiple equilibria and agents may have different preferences among the equilibria. We focu...
Xiao Feng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm
COCOON
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
On the Performances of Nash Equilibria in Isolation Games
: Network games play a fundamental role in understanding behavior in many domains, ranging from communication networks through markets to social networks. Such networks are used, a...
Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero ...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Learning to commit in repeated games
Learning to converge to an efficient, i.e., Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium of the repeated game is an open problem in multiagent learning. Our goal is to facilitate the learning ...
Stéphane Airiau, Sandip Sen