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» Learning to commit in repeated games
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ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Learning to commit in repeated games
Learning to converge to an efficient, i.e., Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium of the repeated game is an open problem in multiagent learning. Our goal is to facilitate the learning ...
Stéphane Airiau, Sandip Sen
ICML
2010
IEEE
13 years 5 months ago
Multi-agent Learning Experiments on Repeated Matrix Games
This paper experimentally evaluates multiagent learning algorithms playing repeated matrix games to maximize their cumulative return. Previous works assessed that Qlearning surpas...
Bruno Bouzy, Marc Métivier
ALDT
2009
Springer
207views Algorithms» more  ALDT 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Anytime Self-play Learning to Satisfy Functional Optimality Criteria
We present an anytime multiagent learning approach to satisfy any given optimality criterion in repeated game self-play. Our approach is opposed to classical learning approaches fo...
Andriy Burkov, Brahim Chaib-draa
SAGT
2009
Springer
192views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To
Computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in general two-player Bayesian games (not to be confused with Stackelberg strategies in routing games) is a topic that has recently been ga...
Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagal...
AAAI
2011
12 years 4 months ago
Learning in Repeated Games with Minimal Information: The Effects of Learning Bias
Automated agents for electricity markets, social networks, and other distributed networks must repeatedly interact with other intelligent agents, often without observing associate...
Jacob W. Crandall, Asad Ahmed, Michael A. Goodrich