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ATAL
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
A Study of Limited-Precision, Incremental Elicitation in Auctions
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
Alexander Kress, Craig Boutilier
CN
2007
111views more  CN 2007»
13 years 5 months ago
An auction mechanism for allocating the bandwidth of networks to their users
We present a mechanism for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period. This mechanism consists of a set of sim...
Manos Dramitinos, George D. Stamoulis, Costas Cour...
FOCS
2010
IEEE
13 years 3 months ago
Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
Generalized Second Price Auction, also knows as Ad Word auctions, and its variants has been the main mechanism used by search companies to auction positions for sponsored search l...
Renato Paes Leme, Éva Tardos
WINE
2007
Springer
182views Economy» more  WINE 2007»
13 years 11 months ago
Mechanism Design on Trust Networks
We introduce the concept of a trust network—a decentralized payment infrastructure in which payments are routed as IOUs between trusted entities. The trust network has directed ...
Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, Daniel M. Reeves, ...
WINE
2009
Springer
128views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
13 years 12 months ago
Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism
Abstract. We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [2] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions and for public project problems, and in each case so...
Krzysztof R. Apt, Evangelos Markakis