Abstract. We consider finding maximin strategies and equilibria of explicitly given extensive form games with imperfect information but with no moves of chance. We show that a max...
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, T...
Perfect recall is the common and natural assumption that an agent never forgets. As a consequence, the agent can always condition its choice of action on any prior observations. I...
Kevin Waugh, Martin Zinkevich, Michael Johanson, M...
ABSTRACT. We formulate a formal framework in which we combine the theory of dynamic epistemic logic and the theory of games. In particular, we show how we can use tools of dynamic ...
Abstract— Many games require opponent modelling for optimal performance. The implicit learning and adaptive nature of evolutionary computation techniques offer a natural way to d...
We develop an algorithm for opponent modeling in large extensive-form games of imperfect information. It works by observing the opponent’s action frequencies and building an opp...