All previous work on “candidate-control” manipulation of elections has been in the model of full-information, simultaneous voting. This is a problem, since in quite a few real...
We study the manipulation of voting schemes, where a voter lies about their preferences in the hope of improving the election’s outcome. All voting schemes are potentially manip...
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections using the unweighted Borda rule. We provide empirical evidence of the manipulability of Borda elections in the form o...
Jessica Davies, George Katsirelos, Nina Narodytska...
Encouraging voters to truthfully reveal their preferences in an election has long been an important issue. Previous studies have shown that some voting protocols are hard to manip...
In this paper, we set up a framework to study approximation of manipulation, control, and bribery in elections. We show existence of approximation algorithms (even fully polynomia...
Eric Brelsford, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaan...