In this paper, we study the class of competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with general (non-quasilinear) utility functions. Mechanism design in general non-quasili...
We consider the problem of online keyword advertising auctions among multiple bidders with limited budgets, and study a natural bidding heuristic in which advertisers attempt to o...
Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorl...
We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions through a mediating auction institution, where each seller must set its individual auc...
Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, N...
In this paper, we consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as ...
Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, N...
We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve pric...
Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, N...