9 search results - page 2 / 2 » Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms |
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2004
ACM
We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn ...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 3 months ago
2010
Springer
We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals. Our goal is to design auctions that are constant competit...
AAAI
2007
13 years 8 months ago
2007
Recent work on online auctions for digital goods has explored the role of optimal stopping theory — particularly secretary problems — in the design of approximately optimal on...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 5 months ago
2008
ACM
Full revelation of private values is impractical in many large-scale markets, where posted price mechanisms are a simpler alternative. In this work, we compare the asymptotic beha...