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» Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
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IAT
2006
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Realising Common Knowledge Assumptions in Agent Auctions
Game theory is popular in agent systems for designing auctions with desirable properties. However, many of these properties will only hold if the game and its properties are commo...
Frank Guerin, Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine
SODA
2003
ACM
121views Algorithms» more  SODA 2003»
13 years 6 months ago
Competitiveness via consensus
We introduce the following consensus estimate problem. Several processors hold private and possibly different lower bounds on a value. The processors do not communicate with each ...
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline
ATAL
2009
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions
A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule that defines the allocation of goods for each agent, and a payment rule that defines the payment of each winner....
Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sa...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
83views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Sham M. Kakade