We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
In a scheduling game, each player owns a job and chooses a machine to execute it. While the social cost is the maximal load over all machines (makespan), the cost (disutility) of ...
Traditional performance analysis of approximation algorithms considers overall performance, while economic fairness analysis focuses on the individual performance each user receiv...
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains bot...
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Angelina ...
We consider the design of strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. We give two simple, but extremely versatile, black-box reductions, that in combination reduce the cost-sharing mec...