14 search results - page 1 / 3 » Mechanism Design for Set Cover Games When Elements Are Agent... |
AAIM
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets,...
STACS
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
Abstract. We develop for set cover games several general cost-sharing methods that are approximately budget-balanced, core, and/or group-strategyproof. We first study the cost sha...
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2003
ACM
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism ...
MST
2010
12 years 11 months ago
2010
We consider a cost sharing system where users are selfish and act according to their own interest. There is a set of facilities and each facility provides services to a subset of ...
UAI
2004
13 years 6 months ago
2004
Mechanism design has found considerable application to the construction of agent-interaction protocols. In the standard setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is n...