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SIGECOM
2003
ACM
141views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 11 months ago
Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
WINE
2007
Springer
120views Economy» more  WINE 2007»
13 years 12 months ago
False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team
We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purch...
Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahy...
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
13 years 11 months ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Strategyproof deterministic lotteries under broadcast communication
The design of deterministic and fair mechanisms for selection among a set of self-motivated agents based solely on these agents' input is a major challenge in multiagent syst...
Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz
SODA
2007
ACM
99views Algorithms» more  SODA 2007»
13 years 7 months ago
Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms
We study a generalization of the classical secretary problem which we call the “matroid secretary problem”. In this problem, the elements of a matroid are presented to an onli...
Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Robert Kleinberg