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TASE
2008
IEEE
13 years 4 months ago
Mechanism Design for Single Leader Stackelberg Problems and Application to Procurement Auction Design
In this paper, we focus on mechanism design for single leader Stackelberg problems, which are a special case of hierarchical decision making problems in which a distinguished agent...
Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari
WINE
2005
Springer
161views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
Design of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Stackelberg Problems
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg p...
Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari
HUMAN
2003
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
A Framework of Winner Determination Algorithms for Internet Auctions
Auctions have become popular in conducting trade negotiations on the Internet. The design of new auction formats and other negotiation protocols has become an important topic for r...
Juhnyoung Lee, Sang-goo Lee, Suekyung Lee
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Mobile opportunistic commerce: mechanisms, architecture, and application
We present mechanisms, architectures, and an implementation addressing challenges with mobile opportunistic commerce centering on markets and mechanisms that support the procureme...
Ece Kamar, Eric Horvitz, Chris Meek
CORR
2010
Springer
142views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 3 months ago
Budget Feasible Mechanisms
We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common econom...
Christos H. Papadimitriou, Yaron Singer