125 search results - page 1 / 25 » Mechanism Design with Partial Revelation |
IJCAI
2007
13 years 6 months ago
2007
Classic direct mechanisms require full type (or utility) revelation from participating agents, something that can be very difficult in practical multi-attribute settings. In this...
AAAI
2007
13 years 6 months ago
2007
In most mechanism design settings, optimal general-purpose mechanisms are not known. Thus the automated design of mechanisms tailored to specific instances of a decision scenario...
AAMAS
2011
Springer
12 years 11 months ago
2011
Springer
Abstract. The central question in mechanism design is how to implement a given social choice function. One of the most studied concepts is that of truthful implementations in which...
AAAI
2006
13 years 6 months ago
2006
SAGT
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
Abstract. A mechanism is manipulable if it is in some agents’ best interest to misrepresent their private information. The revelation principle establishes that, roughly, anythin...