Consider the following network subscription pricing problem. We are given a graph G = (V, E) with a root r, and potential customers are companies headquartered at r with locations...
Vineet Goyal, Anupam Gupta, Stefano Leonardi, R. R...
We study the problem of allocating a single item repeatedly among multiple competing agents, in an environment where monetary transfers are not possible. We design (Bayes-Nash) inc...
— This paper studies an auction based allocation of network resources for short-term contracts for heterogeneous network services. The combinatorial winner selection yields the o...
We explore the revenue capabilities of truthful, monotone (“fair”) allocation and pricing functions for resource-constrained auction mechanisms within a general framework that ...
One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-pr...