We exhibit incentive compatible multi-unit auctions that are not affine maximizers (i.e. are not of the VCG family) and yet approximate the social welfare to within a factor of 1 ...
Abstract: The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (singl...
We present an incentive-compatible polynomial-time approximation scheme for multiunit auctions with general k-minded player valuations. The mechanism fully optimizes over an appro...
Our attention is focused on designing an optimal procurement mechanism which a buyer can use for procuring multiple units of a homogeneous item based on bids submitted by autonomou...
N. Hemachandra, Raghav Kumar Gautam, V. Hastagiri ...
Abstract. Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions extend and generalise all the preceding types of combinatorial auctions. In this paper, we try to make headway on the practical ap...