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AAAI
2006
13 years 6 months ago
Mechanisms for Partial Information Elicitation: The Truth, but Not the Whole Truth
We examine a setting in which a buyer wishes to purchase probabilistic information from some agent. The seller must invest effort in order to gain access to the information, and m...
Aviv Zohar, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
WEBI
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Eliciting Truthful Feedback for Binary Reputation Mechanisms
Reputation mechanisms offer an efficient way of building the necessary level of trust in electronic markets. Feedback about an agent’s past behavior can be aggregated into a me...
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
AAAI
2012
11 years 7 months ago
A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations
Peer prediction mechanisms allow the truthful elicitation of private signals (e.g., experiences, or opinions) in regard to a true world state when this ground truth is unobservabl...
Jens Witkowski, David C. Parkes
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 10 months ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
GRID
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Eliciting honest value information in a batch-queue environment
Abstract— Markets and auctions have been proposed as mechanisms for efficiently and fairly allocating resources in a number of different computational settings. Economic approac...
Andrew Mutz, Richard Wolski, John Brevik