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» Mechanisms for information elicitation
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SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 11 months ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
AMAI
2005
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...
David C. Parkes
GRID
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Eliciting honest value information in a batch-queue environment
Abstract— Markets and auctions have been proposed as mechanisms for efficiently and fairly allocating resources in a number of different computational settings. Economic approac...
Andrew Mutz, Richard Wolski, John Brevik
IJCAI
2007
13 years 7 months ago
Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms
Mechanism design is the study of preference aggregation protocols that work well in the face of self-interested agents. We present the first general-purpose techniques for automa...
Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier
ATAL
2011
Springer
12 years 5 months ago
Information elicitation for decision making
Proper scoring rules, particularly when used as the basis for a prediction market, are powerful tools for eliciting and aggregating beliefs about events such as the likely outcome...
Yiling Chen, Ian A. Kash