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» Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial Auctions
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AAAI
2004
13 years 6 months ago
Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial Auctions
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...
Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm
AMEC
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments
Abstract. In a combinatorial auction, there are multiple items for sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items rather than just on the individual items....
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm