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STOC
2010
ACM
194views Algorithms» more  STOC 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-inte...
Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline, David Malec and Bal...
WINE
2010
Springer
153views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 2 months ago
Approximation Schemes for Sequential Posted Pricing in Multi-unit Auctions
We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing sequential postedpricing mechanisms (SPM) in K-unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller has K copi...
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Eyal Even-Dar, Sudipto Guha, Y...
WINE
2005
Springer
161views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
Design of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Stackelberg Problems
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg p...
Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari
WSC
2000
13 years 6 months ago
Agent-based simulation of dynamic online auctions
The need to understand dynamic behavior in auctions is increasing with the popularization of online auctions. Applications include designing auction mechanisms, bidding strategies...
Hideyuki Mizuta, Kenneth Steiglitz
SODA
2003
ACM
132views Algorithms» more  SODA 2003»
13 years 6 months ago
Online learning in online auctions
We consider the problem of revenue maximization in online auctions, that is, auctions in which bids are received and dealt with one-by-one. In this note, we demonstrate that resul...
Avrim Blum, Vijay Kumar, Atri Rudra, Felix Wu