We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-inte...
Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline, David Malec and Bal...
We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing sequential postedpricing mechanisms (SPM) in K-unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller has K copi...
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg p...
The need to understand dynamic behavior in auctions is increasing with the popularization of online auctions. Applications include designing auction mechanisms, bidding strategies...
We consider the problem of revenue maximization in online auctions, that is, auctions in which bids are received and dealt with one-by-one. In this note, we demonstrate that resul...