We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the co...
Noah D. Stein, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, Pablo A. Parril...
— Achieving the Nash equilibria for single objective games is known to be a computationally difficult problem. However there is a special class of equilibria called evolutionary...
We propose a simple yet rich model to extend the notions of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of strategic games to the quantum setting, in which we then study the relatio...
We present an algorithm to compute a parametric description of the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game in normal form with a fixed structure. Using this representatio...
We present a distribution-free model of incomplete-information games, both with and without private information, in which the players use a robust optimization approach to contend ...