In flow-based mix networks, flow correlation attacks have been proposed earlier and have been shown empirically to seriously degrade mix-based anonymous communication systems. In ...
In this paper, we address issues related to flow correlation attacks and the corresponding countermeasures in mix networks. Mixes have been used in many anonymous communication s...
Ye Zhu, Xinwen Fu, Bryan Graham, Riccardo Bettati,...
Network based intruders seldom attack directly from their own hosts, but rather stage their attacks through intermediate “stepping stones” to conceal their identity and origin...
Location-hidden services, as offered by anonymity systems such as Tor, allow servers to be operated under a pseudonym. As Tor is an overlay network, servers hosting hidden service...
This paper examines a new building block for next-generation networks: SNAPP, or Stateless Network-Authenticated Path Pinning. SNAPP-enabled routers securely embed their routing d...