Abstract. We study the existence and tractability of a notion of approximate equilibria in bimatrix games, called well supported approximate Nash Equilibria (SuppNE in short). We p...
The Lipschitz constant of a finite normal–form game is the maximal change in some player’s payoff when a single opponent changes his strategy. We prove that games with small ...
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytical...
Noah D. Stein, Pablo A. Parrilo, Asuman E. Ozdagla...
In normal scenarios, computer scientists often consider the number of states in a game to capture the difficulty of learning an equilibrium. However, players do not see games in ...
— We consider generalized noncooperative Nash games with “shared constraints” in which there is a common constraint that players’ strategies are required to satisfy. We add...