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AAAI
2006
13 years 6 months ago
2006
AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
2010
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem asserts that any reasonable voting rule cannot be strategyproof. A large body of research in AI deals with circumventing this theorem via computa...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
One possible escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is computational complexity. For example, it is NP-hard to compute if the STV rule can be manipulated. However, there is...
ATAL
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
Recent results have established that a variety of voting rules are computationally hard to manipulate in the worst-case; this arguably provides some guarantee of resistance to man...
CATS
2007
13 years 6 months ago
2007
We study the manipulation of voting schemes, where a voter lies about their preferences in the hope of improving the election’s outcome. All voting schemes are potentially manip...