64 search results - page 1 / 13 » On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations |
ALDT
2009
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2009
Springer
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to players having additive utility functions over the items. We consider allocations in which no player envies the bun...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 3 months ago
2010
Springer
Following Babaioff, Kleinberg, and Slivkins [4], we study single-call mechanisms — truthful mechanisms that evaluate an allocation function only once per instantiation. First, w...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 9 months ago
2010
ACM
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2005
ACM
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...
ICALP
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
In this paper, we consider the mechanism design version of the fractional variant of the scheduling problem on unrelated machines. We give a lower bound of 2 − 1/n for any fracti...