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» On No-Regret Learning, Fictitious Play, and Nash Equilibrium
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ICML
2001
IEEE
14 years 5 months ago
On No-Regret Learning, Fictitious Play, and Nash Equilibrium
Amir Jafari, Amy R. Greenwald, David Gondek, Gunes...
COLT
2003
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
A General Class of No-Regret Learning Algorithms and Game-Theoretic Equilibria
A general class of no-regret learning algorithms, called no-Φ-regret learning algorithms, is defined which spans the spectrum from no-external-regret learning to no-internal-reg...
Amy R. Greenwald, Amir Jafari
LAMAS
2005
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Unifying Convergence and No-Regret in Multiagent Learning
We present a new multiagent learning algorithm, RVσ(t), that builds on an earlier version, ReDVaLeR . ReDVaLeR could guarantee (a) convergence to best response against stationary ...
Bikramjit Banerjee, Jing Peng
ANOR
2005
80views more  ANOR 2005»
13 years 4 months ago
Entropic Penalties in Finite Games
The main objects here are finite-strategy games in which entropic terms are subtracted from the payoffs. After such subtraction each Nash equilibrium solves an explicit, unconstra...
Sjur Didrik Flåm, E. Cavazzuti
SAGT
2010
Springer
127views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
13 years 2 months ago
On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play
Fictitious play is a simple learning algorithm for strategic games that proceeds in rounds. In each round, the players play a best response to a mixed strategy that is given by the...
Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein