In a Stackelberg pricing game a leader aims to set prices on a subset of a given collection of items, such as to maximize her revenue from a follower purchasing a feasible subset o...
Patrick Briest, Martin Hoefer, Luciano Gualà...
We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmet...
Abstract. We consider a Stackelberg pricing problem in directed networks. Tariffs have to be defined by an operator, the leader, for a subset of the arcs, the tariff arcs. Clien...
Alexander Grigoriev, Stan P. M. van Hoesel, Anton ...
We study stochastic models to mitigate the risk of poor Quality-of-Service (QoS) in computational markets. Consumers who purchase services expect both price and performance guaran...
We develop a game-theoretic framework for the study of competition between firms who have budgets to “seed” the initial adoption of their products by consumers located in a s...