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SIGECOM
2008
ACM
152views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 4 months ago
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
Shahar Dobzinski, Mukund Sundararajan
WINE
2007
Springer
171views Economy» more  WINE 2007»
13 years 11 months ago
Characterizing Truthful Market Design
This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...
Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov
FOCS
2003
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan
STOC
2006
ACM
107views Algorithms» more  STOC 2006»
14 years 5 months ago
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira
ICALP
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special ca...
Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier