40 search results - page 7 / 8 » On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatoria... |
ALDT
2009
Springer
14 years 10 days ago
2009
Springer
Traditional performance analysis of approximation algorithms considers overall performance, while economic fairness analysis focuses on the individual performance each user receiv...
ICPP
2008
IEEE
14 years 5 days ago
2008
IEEE
We design an incentive-compatible mechanism for scheduling n non-malleable parallel jobs on a parallel system comprising m identical processors. Each job is owned by a selfish us...
AIPS
2003
13 years 7 months ago
2003
We present economically augmented job shop scheduling (EJSP) as an example of a coordination problem among selfinterested agents with private information. We discuss its signific...
AIR
2004
13 years 5 months ago
2004
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
IOR
2011
12 years 9 months ago
2011
Consider selling bundles of indivisible goods to buyers with concave utilities that are additively separable in money and goods. We propose an ascending auction for the case when ...