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ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation
In the course allocation problem, a university administrator seeks to efficiently and fairly allocate schedules of over-demanded courses to students with heterogeneous preferences...
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, Eric Budish
ATAL
2011
Springer
12 years 5 months ago
Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging
Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles are expected to place a considerable strain on local electricity distribution networks, requiring charging to be coordinated in order to accommoda...
Enrico H. Gerding, Valentin Robu, Sebastian Stein,...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have bee...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
SIGECOM
2011
ACM
256views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2011»
12 years 8 months ago
Competitive equilibrium in two sided matching markets with general utility functions
In this paper, we study the class of competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with general (non-quasilinear) utility functions. Mechanism design in general non-quasili...
Saeed Alaei, Kamal Jain, Azarakhsh Malekian
GRID
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Eliciting honest value information in a batch-queue environment
Abstract— Markets and auctions have been proposed as mechanisms for efficiently and fairly allocating resources in a number of different computational settings. Economic approac...
Andrew Mutz, Richard Wolski, John Brevik