500 search results - page 1 / 100 » On the Hardness of Being Truthful |
FOCS
2008
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
2008
IEEE
The central problem in computational mechanism design is the tension between incentive compatibility and computational ef ciency. We establish the rst significant approximability ...
AAAI
2006
13 years 6 months ago
2006
We examine a setting in which a buyer wishes to purchase probabilistic information from some agent. The seller must invest effort in order to gain access to the information, and m...
FOCS
2003
IEEE
13 years 9 months ago
2003
IEEE
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
AAMAS
2011
Springer
12 years 11 months ago
2011
Springer
Abstract. The central question in mechanism design is how to implement a given social choice function. One of the most studied concepts is that of truthful implementations in which...
COCOON
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2006
Springer
We present an efficient reduction mapping undirected graphs G with n = 2k vertices for integers k to tables of partially specified Boolean functions g : {0, 1}4k+1 {0, 1, } so tha...