We consider the amount of communication required to verify the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism: an efficient allocation together with incentivizing VCG paymen...
We model social choice problems in which self interested agents with private utility functions have to agree on values for a set of variables subject to side constraints. The goal...
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
Moshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Sl...
We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable over-payment problem (and thus economic i...
Weizhao Wang, Xiang-Yang Li, Stephan Eidenbenz, Yu...
Home medical devices enable individuals to monitor some of their own health information without the need for visits by nurses or trips to medical facilities. This enables more con...
Michael J. May, Wook Shin, Carl A. Gunter, Insup L...